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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
26 N. Y. 117, 123 (1862), and in later cases, an agent was held liable
for damages for a breach of contract arising out the agent's implied
warranty on an unauthorized power he assumed to possess. Baltzen
v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467 (1873); Taylor v. Nostrand, 134 N. Y. 110,
31 N. E. 246 (1892); 116 App. Div. 748 (2nd Dept. 1907), 113 N. Y.
Supp. 688, 61 M. 286 (1908). Proceeding further, on a written con-
tract to purchase a plant of a new company to be thereupon organized,
the defendants were not held liable; Fowle v. Kerchner, 87 N. C. 49
(1882); thereby following the point most stressed in the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky, which held that where the agent did not under-
take to guaranty a ratification, one cannot bind him; Murray v. Caro-
thers, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 71 (1858). In the principal case, there is no dis-
pute as to the parties to the contract. The defendant, was not named
as purchaser, but a corporate vendee was specified. There was no mis-
take, either mutually or unilaterally, thus it follows that the contract
was not of the defendant nor can he be a substitute vendee, for to do
so would be the effecting of a new contract. The authority for the
preceding statement has been based upon the qualification of the general
rule of law, as to the agent's personal liability, Ogden v. Raymond,
22 Conn. 379, 385 (1853), (58 Am. Dec. 529), with the aid of another
state's corollary ruling; Belding v. Vaughan, 108 Ark. 69, 157 S. W.
400 (1913), where knowledge is imputed.
Upon authority, therefore, unless it is clear that an agent, upon
the face of the contract is intended to be personally bound, the agent
cannot be held, Mechen Agency (1st Ed.), Sect. 550, and "even though
the contract itself cannot be enforced against the principal, the agent
may be held for the fraud." 2 Clark & Syles, Law of Agency, Sec.
567. Thus, the action on a contract by an unauthorized agent in deal-
ing with another, can be compelled to respond therefor, for the loss
occasioned by his act, Taylor v. Nostrand, 134 N. Y. 108, 110; 31 N. E.
246, 247 (1908), and again, recognized for the damages sustained by
the purchaser. Rowland v. Hall, 121 App. Div. 459, 106 N. Y. Supp. 55
(2nd Dept. 1907). Thus, it is submitted that the action cannot be
properly upheld for specific performance and that relief can only be
granted in an action based upon fraud.
ADIiiRALTY-TURISDICTIN-SUIT FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-PLACE
OF DEATH-INJuRY TO DivER-Plaintiff's intestate, while employed as
a diver by a shipbuilding company, submerged himself from a floating
barge anchored in a navigable river in Texas thirty-five feet from the
bank, for the purpose of sawing off timbers of an abandoned set of
ways, once used for launching ships, which had become an obstruction
to navigation. While thus submerged he died of suffocation due to
failure of the air supply. Damages for the death were recovered from
the employer's insurer under the workmen's compensation law of Texas.
Held, that the facts disclosed a maritime tort to which the general
admiralty jurisdiction would extend save for the provisions of the
state compensation Act; but the matter is of 'Mere local concern and
its regulation by the State will work no material prejudice to any
characteristic feature of the general maritime law. The Act prescribes
the only remedy; its exclusive features abrogate the right to resort to
the admiralty court which otherwise would exist. Millers' Underwriters
v. Braud, 270 U. S. 49 (1926).
The Supreme Court based its decision on the case of Grant Smith-
Porter v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 (1922), which held that where a car-
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penter was injured on an uncompleted vessel lying in navigable waters
that the local statute prescribed an exclusive remedy; that the regulation
of the rights, obligations and consequent liabilities of the parties, as
between themselves, by a local rule would not necessarily work material
prejudice to the general maritime law, or interfere with the proper
harmony or uniformity of that law, or in its international or interstate
relations. See also, Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (1921);
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 19 U. S. 143 (1851); Ex
Parte McNeil, 13 Wall (U. S.) 236 (1871); American Steamboat C.
v. Chase, 16 Hall (U. S.) 531 (1872); The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398
(1907); Sherlock v. Aling, 93 U. S. 99 (1876).
However, the same court has held with reference to other com-
pensation matters in which the admiralty jurisdiction was involved
that because of their special relation to commerce and navigation, that
they were beyond the regulatory powers of the state. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejeweski, 261 U. S. 479 (1922); Washing-
ton v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924); Gonsalves v. Morse Dry
Dock Co., 266 U. S. 171 (1924); Robins Dry Dock Co. v. Dahl, 266
U. S. 449 (1925).
The test of admiralty jurisdiction in torts is that of locality. The
locality test has been applied to cases where a wharf collapsed and
precipitated cargo into navigable waters. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
City of Monterey, 6 Fed. (2nd) 893 (N. D. Cal. 1925). Where a work-
man who fell through an open hatch of a ship while in dry dock had
no remedy in admiralty. The Warfield, 120 Fed. 847 (E. D. N. Y. 1903).
However, there was such remedy in the case of injury to workmen who
were injured by the falling of the anchor from a ship while in dry
dock, though they were not even aboard the ship, but were on a staging
erected for the purpose of enabling them to work outside the ship.
Anglo-Patagonian, 235 Fed. 92, (C. C. A. 4th 1916). So too, a work-
man on a ladder which rested on the wharf, and extended up the ship's
side, was injured by its slipping. The court denied its jurisdiction.
H. S. Pickands, 42 Fed. 239 (E. D. Mich. 1890). Jurisdiction was
denied in a case of a man who fell from a wharf in attempting to
board a vessel, never having reached the ship. Albion, 123 Fed. 189
(N. D. Wash. 1903). In Herman v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 69 Fed.
646 (N. D. Cal. 1895), a laborer working in the hold of a vessel was
injured by a piece of lumber sent down through the chute by a person
working on the pier. It was held that admiralty had jurisdiction. In
The Strabo, 98 Fed. 998 (C. C. A. 2nd 1900), a workman attempted to
leave a ship by a rope on the ship, which was not securely fastened.
In consequence, he fell, being partly injured before he struck the dock,
but mainly by striking the dock. It was held that admiralty had juris-
diction, because the injury occurred on the vessel, i.e., was consummated
on the vessel, the injury on the dock was a mere aggravation of the
one sustained on the vessel.
In view of the foregoing authorities it would seem that the
Supreme Court is going far in permitting a tort occurring on navigable
waters to be governed by a state law. Even though it is said to be a
matter of mere local concern and that it does not in any way work
material prejudice to the maritime law. It is submitted that no state
should assume jurisdiction of an action which by its very nature is
cognizable exclusively in admiralty.
